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i
“The spectre wanders in Europe, the spectre of nationalism” — this is 
how slightly provocatively, considering the not scarred over in the social 
consciousness grudges the source of which were originating from the works 
of the classics attempts to put into practice the communist utopia, starts 
Czesław Miłosz’ essay On Nationalism, from the published in 1988, thus, 
still before the big with consequences events of 1989, book entitled Beginning 
with M y Streets, reprinted in Gazeta Wyborcza of 2—3 Jan., 1993. This 
prophetic sketch contains many valuable for the sociologists thoughts 
devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon which after the tragedy of 
holocaust seemed to have been overcome for good and thrown out of the 
margin of the civilized world. And yet the ghosts have come back and we 
have to do today with the most barbarious signs of ethnonationalism in the 
shape of “ethnic purges” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the eruption of 
mutual hatred between the neighbouring nations in many countries of the 
old Soviet empire with the intensification of the activities of the Neonazi 
movements in the countries of Western Europe, obsessed with hostility 
towards all the cultural, racial, linguistic dissimilarities.
The surprising and not understandable for many return of the tribal 
mentality carrying a large load of resentiments and xenophobia is particularly 
dangerous in the post-communist countries in which still fragile democratic
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institutions are submitted to the pressures growing with market reform, 
tensions and social frustrations. Poland, although relatively ethnically homo­
geneous, is not free from these threats — since “Stranger” may, in case of 
need, become anybody who thinks and feels different, it is known not since 
today that the periods of violent social turning points favour the increase of 
ethnocentrism, irrational, magic thinking, referring to the most basic layers of 
human mentality.1
In the above-mentioned essay Czeslaw Milosz warns us against the 
threats hidden in the close to the Polish tradition romantic nationalism, full 
of mysticism and almost religious exaltation. It does not mean, however, 
that the author sees in each form of nationalism threat for the democratic 
values and individual rights. Similarly to Ernest Gellner (1991) — Milosz 
seems to believe that contemporary nationalism is the natural manifestation 
of the emancipation aims of these nations or ethnic groups which enter the 
road of modernization. Geliner believes that the requirements of modem 
individual production are the structural premises of the occurrence of 
nationalism as a specific conglomeration of politics (state) and culture 
(nation). “Nationalism — E. Gellner writes — is one of the theories of political 
legitimism which requires that ethnic borders do not cross with the political 
borders” (Gellner, 1991:9). From the original thoughts of the author referred 
to by Milosz, it is worth mentioning those which remain in obvious 
contradiction with the stereotypes binding in the circles of the advocates 
and sympathizers of the national thought. Gellner claims that the national 
state is not in any case “the final destiny” of ethnic groups. Nations are 
not “ ‘natural beings’, given by God ways of classifying people. There 
are only cultures — sometimes subtly segregated overlapping, crossed, 
interlaced” (Gellner, 1991:64). Nationalism transforms the existing cultures 
into nation but sometimes annihilates them (!) (Gellner, 1991). The culture 
which nationalism is to defend which it is to revive, is often the invention 
of the very nationalism [or rather — nationalists, K. W.]. The theory of 
nationalism suffers from “false consciousness” — defining the folk culture 
and the traditional order of value, continuity, variety “[...] it produces [...] 
the new higher culture [...], it helps [...] in building the anonymous, mass 
society, it owes its success to the unprecedented turning point which took 
place in the history of our species [i.e. industrial revolution, K. W.] [...] it 
introduces unification” (Gellner, 1991:150—151). “[...] nationalism as an 
ideology produces, thus, its own contradiction, it is an intellectual illusion 
which is shared by the recently appointed from among the man of their 
plebeian compatriots intellectual or cultural élites. The appearance of this 
type of ideology is usually preceded by the experience of humiliation connected 
with the discrimination of the culture of one’s own ethnic group and 
eradication of one’s own culture (with the assumption, having all the features
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of probability that social promotion is connected with the acceptance of 
language and culture of the dominant ethnic group).”
The feeling of humiliation and wrong (one of the most powerful sources 
of resentiment) is sometimes the leaven of many revindication aims directed 
at raising from the “lowlands” the culture of one’s own ethnic group and 
making a pattern out of it binding all inhabiting the given territory. It is this 
that, according to Gellner, national ideology is to serve and its aims are the 
same no matter whether we have to do with great nations or small ethnic- 
-territorial communities who have no chance to become the independent 
politico-economic organisms (Gellner, 1991:63). One can doubt (the author 
himself does so) whether the presented by Ernest Gellner theoretical model is 
of the universal character, whether it allows to understand the source and form 
of such degenerated forms of nationalism as were carried by hitlerism or 
fascism. It is difficult to accept that the observed in Western Europe 
renaissance of national sentiments, taking sometimes the shape of the 
separatist movements (the Basques Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland, 
Wales) have something to do with the ethnic conflicts of Armenians with 
Azers, Georgians with Abkhazs, Serbs with Croatians and Muslims and many 
other nationalistic groups involved in the dramatic events accompanying the 
collapse of the communist empire kept in the artificial uniformity.
Probably right is Ralf Dahrendorf who in Considerations on the Revolution 
in Eastern Europe 1990 notices that Eastern and Western Europe still play in 
different tunes — the second one enters the 21st century — for the first one the 
time goes in the opposite direction. Speaking directly the point is that 
occurring in the highly developed societies of the West ethnic-national 
revindications are the manifestation of the specifically romantic rebellion 
against the universalizing, unifying tendencies of the modern technicized and 
rationalized world (Kloskowska, 1991:19). Nationalism in the post-communist 
countries is born, first of all, of hopelessness and backwardness, has a decisive­
ly destructive character, is manifested mainly in the growth of xenophobia 
excluding all the compromises in relationships between ethnic groups, often for 
generations inhabiting a common territory (Zaslavsky, 1992:107— 108). Czes­
law Milosz rightly underlines that in this part of the world ethnic conflicts 
almost always have religious component and separating strong national 
feelings from religious ones is in these cases almost impossible (Milosz, 1988). 
Absolute loyalty towards one’s own nation, Czeslaw Milosz claims, has 
something of religious belief in it, it concerns for sure also Polish nationalism 
closely tied to Catholicism.
Is, thus, nationalism reviving on the ashes of the communist system 
a phenomenon basically negative and anachronic (Habsbawn, 1990)? Or, as 
Victor Zaslavsky thinks, referring to the above-mentioned work of E. Gellner, 
it is a necessary element of building new democracies, and the economic
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restructuring of the Eastern European countries entering the difficult road of 
accelerated modernization. The latter realized under the motto of “return to 
Europe” would be real only in reference to these countries of Eastern Europe 
whose economy and system quickest adopt to the standards binding in the 
framework of the European Community (Asch, 1990, given after V. Zaslavsky, 
1992:110).
Unfortunately, today it is still impossible to ascertain whether the 
phenomenon of ethnic mobilization observed in the majority of the former 
Eastern Bloc countries, being to a certain extent the understandable form of 
defense against the psychological effects of the shock which for the societies of 
these countries are deep economic-systematic change taking place for last 
years, is permanent or temporary. It is unknown either whether the growth of 
national (ethnic) feelings will have to be every time accompanied by the signs 
of hostility based on the ancient grudges and resentiments. Whether in the face 
of the boundless tragedy which is taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
front of the eyes of the whole civilized world, one can still believe in 
nationalism as a constructive force enabling efficient carrying of market force 
and introducing the western type democracy in the post-communist countries? 
Or whether one can and should worry that ruthlessly enforcing their right 
to self-determination the nations (and ethnic groups) of Eastern Europe 
liberated from the political and military restraint of the recent superpower will 
substitute “slavery under the old government (communist) by local tyranny” 
(R. Dahrendorf, 1991:128)? The advocates of the open society, among them 
the above quoted Czeslaw Milosz, Ralf Dahrendorf or Alain Finkielkraut and 
many others believe that these are not exaggerated worries. Aggressive 
nationalism and the attitude of hostility towards “the strangers” accom­
panying it is an infectious disease that all the nations which make the highest 
value of their own culture and from the right for self-determination (and for 
cultural identity) the cover for ruthless domination of the group rights over the 
individual’s rights (Finkielkraut, 1992) are threated with.
n
In the published in 1990 work The Faces o f the Polish Character, the 
editor of the volume, Antonina Kloskowska carried out a detailed analysis of 
the notions of “national culture” and “national identification” pointing, 
among others, to the dual, affirmative-negative character of the function 
which the culture itself and subjective feeling of affiliation to the specific 
nation or ethnic group may fulfil in relations with other nations or cultural
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groups (Kloskowska, 1990:12ff). How, thus, the author reminds, can the 
culture break the barriers of strangeness but also create them if the natural in 
the human world divisions into “native” and “foreign” are accompanied by 
the belief about both the superiority of one’s own culture and contempt 
towards habits and values of others (Kloskowska, 1990:24). The attitudes of 
this type are usually defined as ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906), and their radical 
manifestations in the shape of xenophobia, i.e. generalized hatred towards 
different cultures or nationalities, are the most distinct expression of the 
negating functions of culture (Sumner, 1906:29).
Poland in its post-war borders has become the state almost unanimous 
nationally. The majority of Poles bom after the war was brought up without 
contact with national minorities so numerously living in the 2nd Republic 
(1918—1939) — Ukrainians (15%), Byelorussians (5%), Jews (9%), Germans 
(2%) (Davies, 1986:120). According to some research workers, this fact 
could negatively influence the shaping in the Polish society of the socially 
accepted models of reaction towards the cultural dissimilarity (Lodziñski, 
1990:259).
Surely, there is a lot of right in this statement, however, the phenomena of 
extreme intolerance and xenophobia occur also in the multiethnic societies, 
such as the United States of America. Thus, the very experience of “multi­
ethnicity” is not the satisfactory guarantee of peaceful coexistence and mutual 
acceptance. Tolerance towards dissimilarity, reactions towards what is strange, 
unknown, distant — is one of the fundamental problems of group life 
over which the generations of research workers incline unanimously, repre­
senting different areas of humanities — from ethnologist, historian, psycho­
logist to sociologist (Nowicka, 1990).
The division of the social world into “native” and “strange” results, 
according to C. Lévi-Strauss, from the most elementary and universal human 
needs, this, however, what rules of separating one and the others will be 
binding in a given society and what will be the practical consequences of this 
division — depends on many factors, first of all, on the cultural openness or 
closeness of a given society. If we assume after E. Nowicka that the openness 
of a given society should be understood, first of all, as “[...] readiness to 
contact with people of a foreign group and accept the contents of foreign 
origin and, at the same time, treating strangers with a relatively small distance” 
(Nowicka, 1990:44), undoubtedly, the societies differentiated internally, 
allowing many alternative variants of cultural patterns (the notion of 
C. Kluckhohn, given after Nowicka, 1990) “[...] offering large margin of 
freedom in the ways of realizing cultural patterns as well as less punitive and 
less rigorous cultures in the matters of deviations from the binding norms have 
greater chances to be more open towards the strangers, both in the sense of 
readiness for contacts and emotional attitude” (Nowicka, 1990). Is, thus,
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confirmed by the results of sociological survey growth of antipathy of Poles 
towards other nations and ethnic groups — Gypsies, Ukrainians, Germans, 
Arabs, Russians, Romanians, Negroes, Jews, Byelorussians (Jasińska-Kania, 
1991:224—225) connected with the cultural closeness of the Polish society? 
Formulating the univocal answer to the above questions is extremely difficult, 
considering that the problems discussed here touch upon a very important 
subject for Poles — attitude towards one’s own tradition, durability of 
national myths and connected with them stereotypes and prejudices towards 
old and new neighbours, etc. In the never ending discussions on the national 
identity of Poles take part the most prominent representatives of the Polish 
humanities — historians, sociologists, ethnologists {Kultura i Społeczeństwo, 
No. 1, 1992). Leaving to the intellectuals solving this extremely ticklish 
problem in which the national mythology mixes up with the sad, sometimes 
difficult to accept historical truth, let us look at what is said on this subject by 
the newest sociological surveys. We will refer here, first of all, to the extremely 
interesting work of the three Warsaw ethnologists: Ewa Nowicka, Sławomir 
Łodziński and Jan Nawrocki published in 1990 and containing the results of 
research carried out by the authors in 1988 within the framework of the topic: 
National stereotypes in the Polish Society, directed by A. Jasińska-Kania on the 
all-Polish sample of 1000 persons (given after Nowicka, 1990:52—53).
Summing up this part of research which referred to the “maps” of ranges 
of homeliness and strangeness in the consciousness of the Polish society, 
E. Nowicka claims that the present national consciousness of Poles is, to 
a large extent, of the polonocentric character [underlining mine, K. W.], is 
based on the strong psychologico-cultural relations with the clear addition of 
the predestined relations (biological continuation). The author arguing with 
the opinion of a prominent historian Tadeusz Łepkowski, expressed in the 
published in 1989 work entitled Uparte trwanie polskości [Stubborn Duration o f 
Polishness] expressed worries that this polonocentrism, so highly evaluated by 
T. Łepkowski, may be the obstacle in the opening of Poles for the universal 
community. Nowicka’s thoughts are developed in the further part of the work 
by the co-author of the discussed research, Sławomir Łodziński who made the 
subject of analysis Poles attitudes towards the strangers belonging to different 
races and cultures and temporarily residing in Poland (for more details, see 
Łodziński, 1990:21 Iff). It turns out that “despite the tradition of openness and 
multicultural character [the author does not specify closer what traditions he 
has in mind, footnote, K. W.], the Polish society has no favourable conditions 
for contact with other cultures and nations. Lack of social roles for “the 
strangers” and model of tolerance, weak sensitivity to their problems and lack 
of honest information as well as other socio-psychological consequences of the 
civilization collapse of Poland point out that it is the inner situation of our 
society [underlining mine, K. W.] that, to a larger extent than other factors,
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defines the specific way of seeing and leads to taking specific attitudes towards 
other races and nations” (Łodziński, 1990:265—266). S. Łodziński critically 
commenting the results of his own research in the light of which Poles 
appear as an extremely tolerant nation and hospitable for the newcomers no 
matter the colour of their skin and cultural differences — shows, the second, 
less favourable for the picture of the fellow-citizens, side of the medal 
— opinions of the very interested, mainly the students coming from the 
third-world countries who have the reasons to feel bad in our country. 
Divergencies between the declared attachment to such values as tolerance and 
lack of prejudices and real, as a matter of fact, discriminating behaviour 
towards strangers is explained by the author by reference to the growing 
feeling of disappointment and frustration connected with the limitation 
of the possibilities of meeting needs and fulfilling important life aims and the 
sources of this state of affair are looked for by the author, among other, 
following S. Nowak and others (Nowak, 1988; Kiciński, Świda, 1987; 
Krzemiński, 1989) in the politico-economic phenomenon of the end of the 
1980s. The observed in the Polish society of the 1980s growth of the level of 
agression, apathy, discouragement, lowering the importance of moral norms in 
regulating everyday contacts between people, moving them from the sphere of 
commonplaceness to “the theatre of ceremonial values” (Krzemiński, 1989: 
71—76) have their continuation in the changed politico-economic conditions. 
Disappointment which was brought to a large number of Poles by a 4-year 
“Solid, .ity” government, with “war on top”,2 growing unemployment and 
lac of real chances for quick improvement of the economic situation is a huge 
reservoir of negative emotions, which easily can find vent in the attacks on the 
newcomers from the East or from the South more and more often appearing in 
our streets. In the climate of social frustration and uncertainty, the popularity 
of the populist-nationalist political groups is usually growing up. They are 
morally responsible for stirring national sentiments above the safe level (see 
skin-heads’ excesses). The acts of hostility are directed not only against 
“strangers-outsiders” residing in our country temporarily but also against 
those few,3 residents often for many generations among Poles “strangers- 
-inners” (Gypsies, Jews, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Germans) raising their 
understandable anxiety and mobilizing to fight against the aggressive majority. 
Small in numbers groups of national (ethnic) minorities have gained recently 
in Poland quite big possibilities of organizing themselves and political 
representation4, but their relationships with the “hosts” are far from ideal. 
However, the so-called average citizen of our country, especially when he lives 
in central Poland, has small chances to find out more about the problems of 
ethnic minorities living in Poland. It happens so that the important in number 
concentrations of national minorities in the peripherial areas of Poland 
creating the regions of cultural borderland (Polish—Lithuanian, Polish—
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—Byelorussian, Polish—Ukrainian, Polish—Czech and Polish—German). 
Thus, the socio-cultural phenomena occurring in these regions now deserve 
special interest of the examiners of ethnic relations in Poland. Here we have to 
do with crossing of various traditions and cultural influences, conflicting of 
contradictory tendencies and identification options, taking often the shape of 
the so-called “borderland consciousness” (Śliwiński, 1991; Dawidiuk, 1991). 
Antonina Kloskowska analysing the phenomenon of the borderland culture 
notices that it [i.e. borderland culture, K. W.] influences in the specific way 
the processes of national self-determination — it either sensitizes the feeling 
of national affiliation and strengthens the defensive attitudes (then we have to 
do with the phenomenon of defensive national identity), or — just the 
opposite, as a result of mixing up of culltural influences, it leads to a specific 
ambivalence (but also polivalence and bivalence) or even washing away 
of the feeling of national identity (Kloskowska, 1992:137—141). Borderland 
consciousness is undoubtedly something else than national consciouness 
characteristic for the members of homogenous national group. Borderland 
consciousness — M. Śliwiński notices — develops not so much “[...] as 
the function of the real origin [ethnic, national, footnote K. W.] of the 
individuals but mainly as a result of conscious choice [underlining mine, 
K. W.] (Śliwiński, 1991:42). On the choice of such or other national option 
attractiveness decides in such cases (e.g. economic, cultural) of the national 
group changing in different historical epochs. As a result, national iden­
tification of the society often remains unspecified and unstable which, from the 
point of view of national majority, seems something ununderstandable 
and suspicious (Sakson, 1990, the same 1991:185—201). It is because of this 
reason that we can expect that together with the deepening of negative 
consequences of systemic transformation in Poland in the borderland regions, 
where the closest neighbour or friend may become “stranger” from day to 
day, xenophobic tendencies, degenerated forms of nationalism or chauvinism 
appear particularly strong. The lesson given to us by Sarajevo, the city in 
which for centuries Croatians, Serbs, Jews, Muslims have lived next to each 
other proves that these are not pure speculations. Let us remember that 
xenophobia refers not only to big ethnic-national groups. In Western Europe 
we have numerous examples of degeneration to which leads chauvinist, blind, 
regional separatism (Basque ETA, IRA, Corsican terrorism). A. Finkielkraut 
quoted above notices in contemporary regional separatist movements the 
influence of the same political romanticism which is present in the majority of 
nationalist ideologies, romanticism which acting in defense of ethnic integrity 
(and cultural identity) prohibits the individual “[...] to go out of its identity 
[ethnic, completion mine, K. W.], absolutizes the differences [...] ruins all the 
community spirit of nature or culture between people” (A. Finkielkraut, 1992: 
80). These important and also brave, because going as if upstream of ideas
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developed in the circles of the most prominent French intellectuals (first of all, 
ethnologists gathered in College de France), reflections of the author of The 
Defeat o f Thinking, make us seriously ponder on the uncritical sometimes 
enthusiasm of the groups expressing opinions for the aggresive forms of group 
identity claims which, as a matter of fact, assume the primacy of the rights of 
the community over the rights of the man.
It does not mean that all the manifestations of local patriotism and 
attachment to the native land could be considered as “failure of Mind 
towards tribal instinct” . This kind of argumentation, attacked with particular 
passion by anti-(post?)-modemists seems a little naive, but, coming back 
to A. Finkielkraut’s argument, fascination with cultural variety cannot mean 
absolutization of differences between ethnic groups and plunging man “with 
head” in his own culture, without the right of choice and critical evaluation 
(Finkielkraut, 1992:82—84). Surely, Alain Finkielkraut’s opinions will not be 
favourably accepted in Poland and not only in the circles of “nationalists”, 
but also among this part of intellectuals who fascinated with ethnological 
concepts of culture absolutize the right of ethnic groups to cultivate their 
own cultural identity even at the price of limiting the rights of some of 
their more individualistic or even rejecting (why not?) their own cultural 
heritage members. Culture, in the understanding of the defenders of the 
rights of ethnic groups to their own identity, often becomes the synonym of 
sacrum, it does not undergo any valuation which, according to Finkielkraut, 
leads to dangerous in consequences absurd — here in the changed shape 
returns the spirit of nativism which substitutes the notion of “race” with 
the notion of “culture”, carrying out new division of the humanity into 
“invincible and non-reducible collective beings” (Finkielkraut, 1992:86). 
The words “culture”, “cultural identity” become against the intentions of 
ethnologists themselves the tool of political fight, the motto overused by 
those against whom was once directed the intellectual movement of fight 
against colonialism and racism. It is worth remembering about warnings, 
maybe slightly too dramatized by A. Finkielkraut when in Upper Silesia 
opinions can be heard calling for revitalization of the Silesian identity. Upper 
Silesia is one of these regions of Poland in which the programmes of 
regionalization are articulated most strongly, in opposition, however, to the 
Wielkopolska or Kashubian regionalism — here we have to do with clear 
separatist component. Understanding the reasons of this state of affair, 
without referring to some elements of the history of this part of Poland, is 
practically impossible.5
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Surprising ease with which (unfortunately!) some modern sociologists 
build generalizations concerning the genesis of regionalism in Upper Silesia 
results probably from the relatively weak knowledge of the complicated 
history of this area. This bitter and, there is nothing to hide, directed to a large 
extent towards myself remark, has occurred to me during a thorough read­
ing of probably underestimated by the sociologists (I do not know if by 
the historians too) work of Eugeniusz Kopeć We and They in Upper Silesia 
published in 1986. In the preface to this book Józef Chlebowczyk, an eminent 
specialist in Silesian problems, stresses with approbation that Eugeniusz 
Kopeć goes decisively beyond the descriptive-factographic, narrative-event 
approach to the reality towards sociological interpretation. As a matter of fact 
E. Kopec’s discussed work, apart from his master’s, J. Chlebowczyk’s works 
and the classical studies of Stanisław Ossowski devoted to the Opole region 
belong to the most important works in the sociology of ethnic relationships 
in Upper Silesia. Before, however, we give the floor to the author of this small 
in volume, but containing much precious information study, let’s remind the 
basic facts.
There is no doubt as to the border-line character of the Upper Silesian 
culture, formulated for the centuries of the Prussian-German (and earlier 
Czech-Moravian and Austrian) presence on the ethnically Polish land 
(Chałasiński, 1935; Fr. Szafranek, 1934; Ossowski, 1965; Gładysz, 1972; 
Chlebowczyk, 1975; Stańczak, 1978 et al.). In the Silesian melting pot for 
centuries have mixed up Polish, Czech-Moravain and German influences 
and the power of their influence was always connected with the affiliation of 
the land to wider politico-state structures (wider, see Wereszycki, 1987; 
Davies, 1981, 1986). The historians of Silesia unanimously claim that the 
19th century was of crucial importance for forming the cultural face of Upper 
Silesia (Chlebowczyk, 1986; Wereszycki, 1987). The sudden acceleration of 
industralization processes (particularly from the middle of the last century) 
and the changes of the local job market connected with it favoured the influx 
of people from Germany to Upper Silesia, first of all, of medium and higher 
office personnal, administrators, engineers, technical supervisors, learned 
professions. These people made the dynamically developing middle class, 
whereas the local people reinforced mainly the working class (Długoborski, 
1986, given after Rykiel, 1991:73). It was then that for the first time to such an 
extent the Silesian linguistic-ethnic group of an essentially plebeian character 
was confronted with the middle-class culture of the German colonizers. This 
specific entanglement of the ethnic-linguistic divisions (as well as religious 
ones, although in this case it is difficult to separate the established in the
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tradition stereotypes from historical truth, wider on this subject, see Robo- 
tycki, 1990:25) with socio-economic (German character =  higher social and 
material status, Polish character =  lower status, plebeian character) for many 
has defined the specificity of the nationalistic processes in Upper Silesia. Apart 
from the unavoidable in the conditions of the government of the Prussian- 
-German politico-administrative, economic, educational (since 1872 — obli­
gatory German education) structures and Kulturkampf realized according to 
a planned cultural expansion of the assimilation processes of these groups of 
the autochthonous population who joined the general trend of civilization- 
-cultural changes even at the price of eradication in one’s own ethno-linguistic 
group — we have here to do with the described in detail in the scientific 
literature phenomena of strengthening the feeling of linguistic-ethnic separate­
ness of the native population closing this community within one’s own culture 
language habit, religion (Chlebowczyk, 1975). Connected with this was the far 
reaching sacralization of “homeliness” and deep dislike of the supralocal 
territorial-state structures. It is in these conditions (obviously presented here in 
a simplified way) that the particular, Upper Silesian variant of the Polish folk 
culture cristalized in the last century being for many tens of years (not without 
the support on the side of the Polish cultural-educational and religious 
organizations) the efficient barrier against the total germanization of the native 
population (Pospiech, 1982, given after Robotycki, 1990:26).
Born during Kulturkampf specific union between the fight for preserving 
the Polish character and Catholic confession has led to “[...] the stereotype 
connecting Catholicism with the Polish character” (Lesiuk, 1990:9). The 
feeling of ethnic separateness of Upper Silesians in accordance with the right of 
background described by S. Ossowski, created in the conditions of the 
Prussian-German statehood the favourable conditions for the activities of the 
Catholic priests education, cultural, political activists directed pro-Polish. The 
culminating point of their activities falls for the period of plebiscites and 
Silesian Uprisings (Davis 1986:116) as a result of which a small part of Upper 
Silesia (together with Cieszyn Silesia) has found itself within the borders of the 
reborn Polish state (Wereszycki, 1987; Wrzesinski, 1988; Kutrzeba, 1988), of 
course, as Cz. Robotycki rightously stresses — the First World War and the 
defeat of Germany have not univocally forejudged the problem of Silesia 
(Robotycki, 1990:27). Not going into the complicated conditions preceding the 
final decisions of the League of Nations and not stepping in the reserved for 
the historians evaluations of the political situation in which Poland has found 
itself after signing the peace treaty with Germany — one can probably accept, 
expressed by Cz. Robotycki opinion, that in the political conditions created 
then in Upper Silesia the occurrence of the sovereign states could not supress 
the mixed ethnic composition in both divided parts of this area (Robotycki, 
1990:29). “None of the sides — Cz. Robotycki writes — resigned from
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the measures which in the future would lead to the change of situation. [...] 
The Polish programme anticipated the activities in three main directions: 
supporting the beliefs of the Silesian population that the border solutions 
are temporary and they will change for the benefit of Poland, strengthening 
the Polish national awareness among people remaining on the other side 
of the border, supporting these manifestations of economy, demography 
and culture which connected Silesia with the remaining parts of Poland” 
(Robotycki, 1990:29, wider see Wrzesiński, 1988). However, already in the 
inter-war period, in the area of Upper Silesia included to the Polish state there 
appeared specific confrontation of the regional Silesian culture with the 
introduced here especially by the numerously arriving Galician intellectuals 
“romantic-nobleman’s Polish national culture” (Kopeć, 1986:37). Of course, 
cultural differences were not the only source of misunderstandings and 
conflicts between the newcomers and the autochthons (wider see Rykiel, 1985, 
1988, 1991).
But specific sensitivity of the Silesians to “[...] the lordly style of life” of the 
Polish office clerks had its source in the earlier described specificity of the 
Silesian national feeling built on the one hand one the opposition towards the 
German character and on the other — on the deep feeling of harm and wrong, 
originating in the times of Kulturkampf. The Silesian dreams about Poland 
were strongly connected with the myth of social equality — “The Silesian 
people — E. Kopeć writes — fought for the Polish state affiliation since it 
connected with it the hopes of social liberation” (Kopeć, 1986:29). The myth of 
just Poland in which so far subjugated and devoid the right for one’s own 
culture and language Silesian people are in gremio promoted to the posts and 
high offices reserved once for the German and those of the Upper Silesians 
who at the price of promotion renounced connections with homely surround­
ings undergoing “germanization” has soon turned out to be phantasy. 
Silesians, according to E. Kopeć, were the only regional group who pro­
claiming themselves in favour of Poland has put forward specific conditions to 
the future state authorities: ensuing the existence at the level at least the same 
as during the Prussian and Austrian times [in reference to Cieszyn Silesia, 
footnote K. W.], abolishing unfavourable [for the Silesians, footnote K. W.] 
social and property classes, opening the unlimited possibilities of social 
promotion (Kopeć, 1986:46). For the reasons, the detailed presentation of 
which would go beyond the framework of his study — these great expectations 
have not been fulfilled. The promises given to the Silesians by the Polish 
plebiscite propaganda has turned out unrealistic, the expected promotion — in 
many cases more difficult than it was expected — it was obstructed by the 
lack of appropriate education of the candidates for the government posts 
(although in the Act on the Organic Statute of the Silesian Province of 15th 
July, 1920 special references have been anticipated for the autochthons)
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and slower than it was anticipated speed of acquiring by the local people the 
literary form of Polish (Kopeć, 1986:56). The situation of the Silesian province 
was worsened by the international obligation of the Republic resulting from 
the Geneva Convention signed on 15th May, 1922, guaranteeing de facto 
preserving the German state of possession in many spheres of economy and, 
what follows — freedom of running the personal policy in one’s own compa­
nies. Let’s add that still fragile institutions of the Polish state soon faced 
serious social tensions connected with the economic recession of 1925—1926. 
The symbol of the growing difficulties of integration of the Silesian province 
with mother country has become the problem of the dictator of the 3rd Silesian 
Uprising, W. Korfanty, who lost the battle for power with the representing the 
camp of the Sanacja (Davis, 1986:123) regime system Silesian voivode, Michał 
Grażyński. In the persons of these two politicians, E. Kopeć reminds, have 
clashed not only two different politico-philosophical options but also totally 
different visions of the integration of Silesian borderland with the sate 
organism of the Republic (ibid., p. 35). The basic source of tensions and 
conflicts at different levels of social hierarchy between the authochthonous 
population and the newcomers was the essential non-congruence of social 
structures cultural patterns, customs, mentality and language of both these 
societies (Kopeć, 1986:80). In the situation of the growing economic crisis, 
unemployment and social unrests connected with it — the immigrants coming 
from other parts of Poland caused aversion and strengthened the Upper Silesia 
in the belief that they are the subject of discriminating activities on the side of 
the Polish authorities. Mutual animosities and distrust deepened cultural 
distances and dissimilarities of ethos — local, conservative-egalitarian with 
strong influences of German culture and vague nationalistic identification 
(J. Misztal, 1984) and the progressive, secularized, attached to the national 
ideas ethos of foreign intellectuals. The conflicts and tensions referred also to 
the workers’ communities — and here, the civilization — cultural differences 
were observed deepened by the regulating towards the newcomers from behind 
the bounds employment policy. The latter element, independently of the reason 
which made the Polish authorities introduce them, has added, according to 
E. Kopeć, to the incresae of provincial xenophobia existing in the Silesian 
province. The feeling of Silesian separeteness has become in the period of great 
economic crisis the factor differentiating the Silesian borderland from the rest 
of the Polish state. What is more — stressing this separateness, not questioned 
by anybody, was instrumentally used by the separatist group, such as The 
Union for the Defence of the Silesians or, founded in 1926, the The Union of 
Native Silesians (Kopeć, 1986:53). The Silesian regional tie covering both Poles 
and Germans living for generation next to each other, often friendly and 
connected by kinship ties has become the subject of numerous manipu­
lations not only on the side of the openly separatist groups but also Christian
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Democracy oppositional towards the government camp (after 1926). Grażyń­
ski himself trying to neutralize the influences of W. Korfanty and his advocates 
has undertaken, at least partially successful, attempt of adding value to the 
Silesian culture by actively joining the occurring then in Poland regionalist 
movement which was patronized, among others, by Władysław Orkan and 
Stefan Żeromski (Kwiatkowski, 1984). Rehabilitation of the Upper Silesian 
homely surroundings, ennoblement of the Upper Silesian dialect, stressing 
its connection with the historical Polish language, interest in the Silesian 
folk culture as a source of spiritual richness of the Silesians which “saved 
the Polish people in Silesia for Poland” (Kopeć, 1986:187) — all these activities 
of the contemporary administrative authorities of the Silesian province 
objectively aimed at the appeasement of the growing provincial xenophobia 
(scrupulously fanned by the German propaganda) was brutally broken by the 
Second World War.
The Hitler’s occupation, including all Upper Silesia together with the part 
of Kielce Province (the districts of Sosnowiec and Będzin) and the Cieszyn 
Silesia into the Reich, have brought complete break of open ties with Polish 
tradition. Persecutions of Polish, carried out with the German consequence as 
well as carried out on an unparalleled in other regions scale of action of 
enrolment on the so-called Volksliste6, favoured it (Broda-Krężl, 1978). The 
Volksliste action covered the whole Silesian population, however, in the old 
Silesian Province over half of the population (64.1%) was included into III 
nationalistic group which, according to the German settlements, meant lack of 
crystalized national awareness (Błaszczak-Wacławik, 1990:48). For anybody 
who at least slightly understands the complexity of the ethnico-nationalistic 
identification of the Silesians, it is not a secret that the formal access to 
German nationality, in the form of enrolment on the Volksliste, was in Upper 
Silesia of decisively smaller importance than in General Government (Davis, 
1986:69), and did not in fact mean regermanization (which, as a matter of fact, 
was the reason of dissatisfaction of the officers of Hitler’s administration 
responsible for the German nationalistic policy, (wider on this subject, see 
Adamski, 1948, given after Błaszczak-Wacławik, 1990:50). However, in the 
opinions and feelings of many Poles going through the gehenna of occupation 
without these substitutes of “normality” which were given to the inhabitants of 
Upper Silesia, the attitudes and nationalistic declarations of the Silesians were 
the evidence of opportunism and even national treason (Błaszczak-Wacła­
wik, 1990:57—58). This far too simplified an unjust stereotype of “the 
Silesian-renegade” has strengthened, first of all, in the consciousness of people 
inhabiting the areas of Zagłębie Dąbrowskie neighbouring with the former 
Silesian Province — it is not by accident that the management personnel 
of the Zagłębie industrial works and the officials of Hitler’s administration 
were recruited in this part of the Katowice Notary mainly from aboriginal
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Silesians. These and other “actions” of the invader consequently aimed at 
breaking up the ties of Upper Silesia with the remaining Polish land and 
sharpening the nationalistic antagonisms in the very Upper Silesian com­
munity.
After painful occupational experience the tragical mistake of the Polish 
authorities turned out to be the policy nationalistic verification carried out in 
a shameful way, without even minimum orientation in the specificity of the 
ethnic situation of Upper Silesia. Soon after the war, especially in the years 
1945— 1946, there were mass arrests and deportations of people admitting 
ties with German nationality, thousands of Silesians (including former Silesian 
insurgents!) got to the camps of forcer labour in the Soviet Union, less than 
half of them came back home at the end of the 1940s (and even later, see 
Szymański given after Siwiec, 1992) ruined physically and mentally. Those 
who of their own will or under pressure decided to solicit rehabilitation 
and restoration of civil rights (it concerned, first of all, people with the 
II Volksliste category), were suffering humiliation, fear and torment (Łempiń- 
ski, 1979). There were cases of the acts of revenge and cruelty which were 
committed by the recent victims of Nazi terror (Berlińska, 1993) as well as 
ordinary corrupt practices and offences on the side of the Soviet military 
authorities, Security Office or Police (Błasiak, 1990:74). Not uncommon were 
the cases of displacement of autochthons whose property was taken over by 
the corrupted representatives of the civil service, being recruited, dominantly, 
from the newcomers (Misztal, 1984, after Rykiel, 1991:77). There are many 
proofs that the deep grudges and feeling of harm which occurred then have 
marked with the seal of distrust and aversion the relationship between native 
people and “the newcomers” (Błasiak, 1990).
The bitter paradox of history can be called the fact that the way of solving 
the Volksliste problem accepted by the Polish authorities meant, as a matter of 
fact, recognizing the German legal state and laying almost all the population of 
the former Silesian Province a “potential charge of national treason and 
collaboration with Hitler’s invader” (Błasiak, 1990:70, wider see Łempiński, 
1979:103).
The tragedy of the situation was completed by the fact of mass par­
ticipation of the Silesians in the German military formation (Wehrmacht). 
Many of them did not come to Silesia after the war where their wives and 
children still remained. It was, as it is known, one of the important reasons of 
emigration of the native population to Germany in the years 1947— 1949 and 
— in the framework of the so-called action of uniting families soon after the 
October 1956 (Davis, 1986:6— 10 and Łempiński, 1979:246). Let’s add also the 
Silesians, former solidiers of the Polish Military Forces in the West, mainly 
prisoners of war and Wehrmacht deserters, did not come back home (wider see 
Małkiewicz, 1982, unpublished Ph.D., given after Błasiak, 1990).
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In the context of the post-war dramas of verification of nationalistic 
Upper Silesian community, the appearance in this area of huge masses of 
newcomers displaced according to the Soviet concept of solving the problem of 
the Polish borders accepted in Yalta by Western Allies (Kersten, 1985) from 
the former Eastern borderland of 2nd Republic had to cause the strong 
feeling of threat among native population. It was strengthened by the 
commonly prevailing slackness and chaos which the Polish administration 
taking over authority from the hands of the Soviet military commanders 
was not able to control (wider see Łempióski, 1979; Misztal 1984; Kersten, 
1985). In the territory of the former Silesian Province, which particularly 
interests us here, the main waves of the immigrants came from the neigh­
bouring Zagłębie Dąbrowskie7 and adjoining it south-eastern provinces 
(Cracow, Kielce as well as Rzeszów) (given after Błasiak, 1990:80). The closest 
neighbours, mainly the inhabitants of Zagłębie, came as the first ones, 
together with the Soviet Army in the morally doubtful (although maybe 
psychologically understandable) role of “the judges of the Polish character of 
Silesia” (Gołba, 1945, here after Błasiak, 1990). From there, “from behind 
the border” , have been recruited to a large extent the officers of “the new 
order”, communist administration, security forces, police (wider, see the 
above quoted study of Błasiak, 1990). In the situation of the specific branding 
the Silesians with the “national-civil inferiorists” (Błasiak, 1990) which 
many of them experienced as personal tragedy the foreign origin of the 
new political “élites” was of crucial importance for shaping the negative 
stereotype of “the inhabitants of Zagłębie” — gorols accused of all the wrong 
and misfortunes experienced by the native population after the war. On the 
side of the immigrants, the answer was the simplified and equally negative 
stereotype of hanys, the man with the unshaped national affiliation whom 
you cannot trust. The specific intensification of the anti-Silesian phobias 
falls in the period of Stalin’s terror when the meritiorious for the matter of 
the Polish character of Silesia nationalistic activists, such as Arka Bożek, 
have been debarred from posts of authority (Śmiałek-Wróblewska, Sputek, 
1988, given after Błasiak, 1990:94). Independently of the real reasons by 
which the contemporary political authorities were prompted carrying out this 
kind of purges of the administrative apparatus (first of all), the belief has 
fixed in the common consciousness of the Silesian that only ethnico-national- 
istic motives were hiding behind it (Błasiak: 1990:95). This tendency to see 
all the problems of Upper Silesia in the ethnic categories with strongly 
marked feeling of wrong towards the “non-one’s countrymen” political élites 
has been preserved through all the post-war period, first of all, among the 
few representatives of the native middle classes — it was they who suffered 
the greatest humiliation and frustration resulting from blocking or limiting 
the access to the posts in state administration, education or culture, occupied
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by the “newcomers” obedient to the orders from “the Head Office” (Wódz [J.] 
(ed.), 1990).
The mass influx of the culturally heterogeneous population to Upper 
Silesia has led to the typical in this situation clash of cultures, stressing and 
sensitizing of the objectively existing cultural differences between the native 
population and the newcomers — starting from the problems of the language 
(Upper Silesian dialect), through the patterns of the family-neighbourhood 
co-existence, the attitude towards work (considered as the most characteristic 
discriminant of the Silesian workers’ ethos) and ending with the patterns of 
religious life (wider see Wódz |K], 1992). The feeling of wrong, inferiority and 
humiliation felt by the native population in contacts with the representatives of 
the foreign intellectuals, engineering technical personnel, representatives of 
higher levels of party-state administration, in the case of mass recruitment to 
work in industry of unqualified workers gave way to contempt and belief of 
one’s “civilization” superiority. In contact with the unprepared for hard work 
in mines and iron works and urban life conditions country population from the 
region of Rzeszów, Kielce or the Cracow Province — the local workers’ 
communities for generations connected with the industrial tradition gained 
confirmation of the negative opinions about the werbus, gorots, trying to pick 
a quarrel, szumowniki unstabilized in terms of life conditions (W. Mrozek, 
1964). However, theses gorols attracted to Silesia by promises of high income 
and “social promotion” , have either quickly run away from here not standing 
the trial of hard physical work in the mines or iron works, or have struck roots 
making use of the preferential allowance of flats in the gigantic dormitories 
shooting up like mushrooms on the outskirts of the Silesian towns. The 
post-war housing policy ruthlessly subordinated to the needs of the industrial 
production has to a large extent added to fixing the earlier existing socio- 
-ecological structures of the towns of Upper Silesia and deepening the socio- 
-spatial distances between the native population concentrated, first of all, in 
the old housing estates and the immigrants settled only in the new buildings 
(Frąckiewicz, 1983). The fate of the old workers’ districts of the industrial part 
of Upper Silesia are the most striking expression of the marginalizations of 
considerable groups of regional community of Upper Silesia in the period of 
real socialism — as opposed, however, to the quite commonly proclaimed 
stereotype — the Silesian blue-collar has not become a Croesus in the Polish 
People’s Republic and the presented, especially in the times of Gierek’s success 
propaganda, optimistic pictures of smiling, extracting in the sweat of their 
brows and supporting the “right forces” miners, have turned out equally false 
as the enthusiasm manifested by the prominent winners of the state awards 
“for merits for the development of the socialist motherland” . Hoping that the 
nearest years will allow to correct the deformed for years of impudent 
propaganda picture of Upper Silesia, I will only make a statement which,
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as one can expect, many will accept with disbelief — for almost the whole 
period of real socialism it would be difficult to point to the second region in 
Poland in which the symbolic contents passed in the official circulation (mass 
media, through educational, cultural institutions, etc.) would swerve so 
much from the symbols and values functioning within the framework of the 
first system of culture (i.e. in the framework of primary group or local 
community, distinction introduced by Kloskowska, 1981). Again and again 
these divergences were observed, for example, during conflicts caused by 
ostentation ignorance of Silesian towards formal education the lack of which 
the Silesians themselves have often successfully compensated with higher 
culture of work and many years’ professional experience. The Silesian workers’ 
community as a whole to a small extent has used the undoubtful (at least 
formally) possibilities of social promotion through education. The sociological 
research of the 1970s and 1980s show that although since the end of the 1950s 
in the Silesian workers’ families disappears the tradition of inheriting by the 
sons father’s profession, still we have to do here with the reproduction of the 
social status of parents, first of all, in connection with limiting the educational 
aspirations of Silesian youth (Mrozek, 1987). Let’s say it openly — such a state 
of affairs has for many decades been consciously supported by the regional 
party-economic bureaucracy — realizing “economic tasks” coming from “the 
head office” . Following the mad assumptions of “the socialist planned 
economy”, the heavy industry of Upper Silesia was to fulfil “the landable” role 
of “the raw material-energetic source” — it meant in practice limiting the 
developmental possibilities of the regional economy, strengthening its mono- 
cultural character together with all the negative consequences of this state of 
affairs from economic, through socio-cultural, ending in ecological (Kramer 
(ed.), 1988). The authoritatively imposed model of extensive industralization 
forced the specific structure of the regional job market, first of all, unqualified 
labour force was needed — it was not by accident, then, that in the structure of 
secondary education of the Upper Silesian Industrial Basin vocational schools 
have dominated until, attached to the most important branches.
As a matter of fact, thus, the regional system of education favoured the 
continuation of the traditional models of educating Silesian children and 
youth, with time it started to play the role of one of the main limiters of the 
educational promotion of this community (Blasiak, 1980:118). Of course, the 
objective educational limitations were not the only reasons of socio-cultural 
marginalization of large groups of native population of the former Silesian 
Province. We have mentioned above the specific for the industrial part of 
Upper Silesia ecologico-social processes thanks to which the old dating, to the 
end of the last century workers’ districts have become specific enclave of the 
native community which up till now have preserved many features of local 
communities (Wódz [K.], 1992).
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By the right of paradox, it was in old workers’ districts of the towns 
of the Upper Silesian Industrial Region that the conditions favouring the 
preservation and cultivating of local traditions, dialect, treated as the basic 
marker of belonging to the group of countrymen, allowing to separate 
oneself from the non-Silesian surrouding, have emerged. The supporting of 
separateness of the native population towards the newcomers was also 
favoured by the branched network of informal family-neighbourhood ties 
which could not be ruined by the rides of depatures for Germany in the 
1950s and the 1970s. The processes of erosion and sinking of Upper Silesians 
into the culturally heterogeneous community of immigrants was prevented 
by the presented up till today endogamy — there were cases of the 
non-Silesians marrying into the resident for generations Silesians families, the 
opposite examples were rare (Rykiel, 1989). The closed circle of social 
relationships low socio-spatial mobility (departures for Germany never meant 
breaking ties with one’s countrymen) created particularly favourable con­
ditions of the reproduction of local culture, the carrier and at the same time, 
the basic element of which, was and is the Silesian dialect. In the individual 
scope socialization in the traditional Silesian family, in the culturally homo­
geneous local community, mean acquiring together with the dialect, the 
specific level of linguistic-cultural competence, and, thus, forming specific for 
these communities primary habitus which often turned out to be disfunctional 
towards the requirements of the educational system (Błasiak, 1990:144ff; Łęcki 
et al., 1992). Referring, thus, on the one hand to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus and, on the other, to Basil Bernstein’s theory of linguistic codes, we can 
look at educational failures of children from the traditional Silesian en­
vironments from the point of view of their linguistic-cultural equipment which 
very often had become cultural inadequacy painfully felt in the contact with 
school (Łęcki et al., 1992:27). One cannot exclude that the lowering of the level 
of educational aspirations, so common among Silesian youth, was a specific 
form of defense against difficulties in learning easy to foresee (Błasiak, 
1990:114ff). It referred, first of all, to the arts subjects the learning of which 
required acquiring the literary form of Polish and together with it — essentially 
foreign distant from the historical experience of one’s own ethnic group 
cultural tradition (Łęcki et al., 1992:27). The secondary school — unfor­
tunately! — has often been this place where the children from Silesian families 
have experienced the effects of negative stigmatization of their native dialect, 
for many this experience has turned so painful that it decided on the attitude 
towards school, teachers and to these of colleagues who had no such problems 
(Bieniasz, 1991:30).
It is in this way that there appeared specific feedback between the outer and 
inner limiters of the educational promotion of Silesian children and youth
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leading finally to fixing the marginal position of the wide parts of native 
population.
This situation, let’s repeat, was during the whole post-war period very 
convenient for the regional and central party-state administration since it 
allowed to realize without any obstacles gigantic industrial investments, 
absorbing the innumerable amount of unqualified labour force. The latter was 
recruited from both the local population and the foreign element, however, till 
the end of the 1980s there existed additional barrier of social promotion 
towards the Silesians in the form of the unwritten rule of moderate trust 
applied the more willingly the wider the Silesians used specific legal regulations 
facilitating them settling in Germany. It is not necessary to add that these 
privileges are very often the subject of envy and desire on the side of the 
newcomers bom  in other parts of Poland, they confirmed their belief about the 
double-dealing and opportunism of Silesians who were ready to renounce the 
Polishness for the right of using the German prosperity (Marek, 1991).
Passing such evaluations, the newcomers from the up-country did not 
trouble to understand the complicated motives of the emigration decisions of 
the Silesians, dictated often by the feeling of bitterness and grudge towards 
those who came here after the war in search of their place on earth and made it 
unbearable for the natives.
Sum m ing up the present consideration, we can ascertain that the post- 
-war fate of the Upper Silesian community not only did not facilitate the 
integration of the newcomers with the native population but strengthened 
the isolationist tendencies lying in them, they strengthened many negative 
stereotypes, both among the foreign population (Silesian =  German) and 
among the Upper Silesian threatened in their rights “to be themselves at 
themselves” who explained all their miseries by the presence of immigrants.
In recent years in Upper Silesia appear regional movements which build 
their political programme on the feeling of wrong and underprivilage in 
reference to the newcomers.
The few so far examiners who have attempted at explaining the essence of 
this new Upper Silesia regionalism (Berlińska, 1990; Błasiak, 1990; Gerlich, 
1992; Szczepański, 1993) concentrate on the current political, economic, 
cultural conditionings of this phenomenon, without noticing the surprising 
convergence of argumentation of contemporary Upper Silesia regionalists with 
the concepts and proposals of their predecessors, once concentrated round 
Wojciech Korfanty.
The leading idea of the most influential regional associations openly 
referring to the political heritage of the prominent Silesian patriot is the 
integration of regional community round the traditional Silesian values, such 
as family, work and religion (Klasik, 1988) and the final political aim 
— restoration in Upper Silesia of the systemic solutions from the inter-war
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period with advanced regional autonomy (Kositza, 1991). The above-mentio­
ned traditional values, against the opinions of some Upper Silesian regionalists 
ar not “the signs of the identity of this region” (Klasik, 1988). The so- 
-called “regional values” , as Czeslaw Robotycki has rightly recently observed, 
are, as a matter of fact, the mythologized picture of one’s own regional group, 
idealized and strongly emotionally tinged (Robotycki, 1990:32, cf. also 
Gerlich, 1992). The attempts at mythologizing one’s own past are often 
accompanied by specific nostalgy for “the lost paradise” whose artistic 
expression can be found in the Silesian films of Kazimierz Kutz, in Janosch’s 
novels, in Horst Bienek’s creative output (Robotycki, 1990:33). However, 
the idyllic, devoid of arrises, picture of the Silesian past, opposed to the 
desintegration and chaos introduced here by the “newcomers” occurs not 
only in literary or artistic expressions, it is also reflected in the academic 
expressions marked by evaluation, whose authors uncritically repeat simpli­
fied, black-and-white mental schemes, glorifying one’s own regional group 
and opposing it to the “newcomers”, embodying the whole evil of this world 
(see especially Bukowska-Floreńska, 1987, wider see Gerlich, 1992). Of course, 
these types of attitudes are nothing exceptional in the history of 
human communities, evaluating the past and its mythologization gain in power 
in the decisive periods and are, to a certain extent, natural reaction to 
disappointments and frustrations the sources of which are in the present. 
However, in the case of Upper Silesia, with its complicated history and cultural 
mixing, mythologization of the past means not only its idealization but also 
— unfortunately — its ideologization, which, similarly to Cz. Robotycki, 
I understand, first of all, as an attempt at giving the universal status to one of 
many possible versions of the past (tradition, culture) of this region (Robo­
tycki, 1990:31). In opposition to Cz. Robotycki, I do not think that similar 
phenomena could be discussed only in reference to the obsessive attempts at 
proving the Polish character of Silesia, changed into the impudent changing 
of history, barbarious destruction of architectural monuments, questioning 
the contribution of the German creators into the culture of Silesia, etc. (ibid.). 
The expression of specific ideologization of the past are the postulates of 
revitalization of Silesian culture raised by some regional movement, based on 
completely wrong and having no justification in ethnosociological data 
assumption that Silesian culture is still, despite the passing of time and 
irreversible to a large extent demographic-social processes, indivisible, compact 
whole, in many respects exceptional and attractive for all the inhabitants of 
Upper Silesia, no matter who they are and where they come from (Declaration 
o f the Upper Silesian Union, 1990, wider see Gerlich, 1992). Stressing the 
cultural separateness of Upper Silesia, magnifying the objectively existing 
cultural differences between the native population and the newcomers, at the 
same time promoting the primacy of “the Silesian character” over the culture
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of the newcomers, as well as the national culture (wider see Gerlich, 1992), 
brings the contemporary Upper Silesian regionalism closer to ethnonationa- 
lism occurring in many peripheral regions (Gourevitch, 1979). Referring to 
local traditions, exposing specific features of the Silesian regional ties (Ossow­
ski, 1967), supporting and even strengthening isolation tendencies basing on 
strong community ties (Gerlich, 1992:29) more and more often serve the 
campaign run by the regional groups for regionalization — from the concept 
of great Silesia presented by the activists of the Upper Silesian Union till the 
projects of restoring the legal state of the Silesian Province from the inter- 
-war period popularized by the Movement of Silesian Autonomy (Kositza, 
1993).8 The latter seem particularly dangerous, taking into account the 
dissimilarity of geopolitical conditioning, nationalistic relationships, economic 
situation of Upper Silesia from the inter-war period in comparison with 
contemporary times. Upper Silesia is not the Western border of the Republic 
today, the native population — apart from the country areas — does not 
exceed even half of its present inhabitants. Affected by the heaviest consequen­
ces of the errors of “socialistic industralization”, the industrial part of Upper 
Silesia is facing the dramatic civilization challenges which it can cope only with 
the solidary support of the whole country. Arduousness of everyday life, 
tiredness and fear of more and more real unemployment, loss of the social 
prestige by these professional groups which not long ago were on top of the 
hierarchy of income, are the explosive potential which is revealed in the 
following strike waves.
Aggressive ethnoregionalism antagonizes the regional community, inten­
sifies the feeling of uncertainty, causes on the side of “the newcomers” , 
threatened in their civil rights, counterreactions in the form of manifestations 
of the populist-nationalistic groups directed against regionalization projects, 
treated as the introduction of separating Upper Silesia from Poland (see 
Szczepański, 1993). I t should be added that contrary to what the ideologists of 
regionalism acting in defense of the “Silesian identity” think — the notions of 
region, regionalism, autonomy are extremely weakly rooted in the common 
consciousness. In the sociological survey carried out in 1992 under the 
supervision of M. Szczepański among 320 inhabitants of Tychy, it has been 
observed, among others, that as many as 37.7% of the examined admit that 
they do not quite known what “regionalism” means, the majority of them 
(62.7%) associate this notion, first of all, with individual, deeply rooted 
memories, connected with birth, residence or living long in particular parts 
of the country, only every fourth of the examined inhabitants of Tychy p. nts 
out that the level of identification with the region depends, first of all, on the 
deep knowledge of the culture of regions, their dialect, customs and traditions 
(Szczepański, 1993). The decisive minority (27.2%) of the examined from 
the above-mentioned Tychy research is for the full, economic and political
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autonomy of Upper Silesia, the remaining either have no definite opinion on 
this matter (50.6%) or are against it (22.2%) (Szczepański, 1993). Summing 
up the author categorically claims that, at least in the case of Tychy, and 
maybe the whole region — “as political abuse one should consider attempts 
at legitimization or rationalization of activities aiming at regionalization 
with the help of reference to the support of public opinion” (Szczepański, 
1993). There is no doubt that regional ideology has not, so far, got too 
many advocates either among the native population or — the more so as 
— among the newcomers, although undoubtedly in both these groups there is 
a potential of ethnocentrism and xenophobia which, through irresponsible 
activities of the politicians and deteriorating economic situation, may turn 
into the open conflict. Without forejudging the direction of evolution of the 
ethnic relationships in Upper Silesia (i.e. being of interest to us here the former 
Silesian Province) one should warn the local élites against the dangers coming 
from ideologizing the problem of cultural identity of the Silesians, connecting 
it with any political programme. Upper Silesia as the region of cultural- 
-linguistic borderland is facing today the exceptional chance of overcoming the 
prejudices and stereotypes accumulated for decades and having negative 
influences on the mutual relationships between the native and the newcomers, 
it may, however, become the scene of confrontation of the most aggressive 
ethnoregionalism with shauvinism and Polish or German nationalism. Let’s 
hope that the progressing processes of institutionalization of regional identity 
will not mean the growth of tensions and conflicts between the natives and the 
newcomers. Responsibility for further development of the events lies, first of 
all, on the main actors of the local political scene but also, to a large extent, on 
the academic community which should not stop in aiming at showing the 
complex truth on the socio-cultural face of Upper Silesia.
Notes
1 Recently many interesting publications have appeared presenting the situation and identification 
problems of the minority groups living at present in Poland (Cała, 1992; Melchior, 1990; Kurcz, 
1991; Sakson, 1991; Sadowski, 1992). These publications, still too few, have to fulfill, apart from 
cognitive functions, the educational role in breaking the ancient and fixed stereotypes and 
prejudices and in making the Polish majority aware of the duties resulting from the real cultural 
differentiation of our society.
2 E-.pression used by Lech Wałęsa at spring 1990, proclaiming the beginning of the division of 
new Solidarity elites.
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3 The number of ethnic minorities in Poland after the Second World War is about 2% of whole
• population.
! 4 It should be important to mention that Poland after 1989 has introduced several law regulations
I favourable to ethnic minorities, like special electoral law, the possibility to teach minorities 
languagues at school, special programmes for social and cultural activities of ethnic groups, 
etc.
5 To avoid misunderstandings connected with divergent opinions of historians, ethnographs, 
geographers on the actual range of Upper Silesia, I am explaining that the considerations 
presented here apply almost exclusively to this part of historical Upper Silesia (covering, first of 
all, the part of the Katowice Province separated on the East by former partition borders 
dividing Upper Silesia and Zagłębie Dąbrowskie) which in 1922 was in the borders of reborn 
Poland. I am stressing this fact not because some autonomous groups give it a symbolic meaning 
— there will be a more detailed discussion of it — but because it is in this part of Upper Silesia 
where the conditions favouring the creation of specific attitudes and xenophobic tendencies 
appeared which reapear in the current programmes of revitalizing of Silesian identity. For the 
details concerning the history of Poland see Davies, 1981, 1986.
6 Volksliste was the element of the Nazi national policy of germanization in the areas 
incorporated to III Reich after 1939 (Upper Silesia, Great Poland). The aim of this policy was to 
separate the German or those who could be recognized as German from other part of 
population.
7 The extreme part of Katowice Province which at the time of partition of Poland (1795—1918) 
belonged to the Russian Empire (Davis, 1986:354).
8 The above analysis is far from being complete since it does not take into account the 
organizations of the German minority acting on the regional political scene, there are, on the 
one hand, the Socio-Cultural Society of the Population of German Origin from the Katowice 
Province and, on the other, run by Dietmar Brehmer, German Working Community 
“Reconciliation and Future” . Both these organizations — in opposition to the similar 
associations acting in the Opole region, keep far going moderation in the matters of regionalism 
and autonomy. Wider see Gerlich, 1992:33fT.
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Kazimiera Wódz
Rewitalizacja śląskiej tożsamości — szanse i zagrożenia
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Artykuł składa się z trzech części. Część pierwszą i drugą poświęcono analizie zjawiska 
etnocentryzmu we współczesnym świecie, w tym także w Polsce. Autorka zastanawia się między 
innymi nad przyczynami rewindykacji etniczno-narodowościowych, których widownią stały się 
kraje byłego bloku wschodniego, rozważa podobieństwa i różnice między nacjonalizmem, 
etnoregionalizmem, separatyzmem, odwołuje się do wyników prowadzonych w Polsce w ostatnich 
latach badań socjologicznych, ukazujących wzrost nastrojów ksenofobicznych i niechęci wobec 
innych narodów. W trzeciej części artykułu autorka wyjaśnia źródła napięć etnicznych na Gór­
nym Śląsku, zwracając szczególną uwagę na historyczne uwarunkowania separatyzmu górno­
śląskiego.
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Neubelebung der schlesischen Identität — Chancen und Bedrohimgen
Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g
Der Artikel besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste und zweite Teil wurde der Analyse des 
Phänomens des Ethnozentrismus in der gegenwärtigen Welt, darunter auch in Polen, gewidmet. 
Die Autorin erörtert unter anderem die Gründe der ethnisch-nationalen Neubelebung, die in 
den Ländern des ehemaligen Ostblocks auftauchten; sie analysiert die Ähnlichkeiten und 
Unterschiede zwischen dem Nationalismus, Enthnoregionalismus und Separatismus; sie beruft 
sich auch auf die Ergebnisse der in Polen in den letzten Jahren durchgeführten soziologischen 
Untersuchungen, die eine Steigerung der xenophobischen und ablehnenden Stimmungen anderen 
Völkern gegenüber aufweisen.
Im dritten Teil des Artikels erklärt die Autorin die Gründe der ethnischen Spannungen in 
Oberschlesien, indem sie besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf die historischen Grundlagen des 
schlesischen Separatismus lenkt.
